

Dealing with Cyberthreats

—

A European perspective

2015 NSF Cybersecurity Summit

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
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CERN

- International organization
 - Astride the Franco-Swiss border
- CERN has 21 member states
 - Cooperation with EU, many other states and organizations
- 600+ institutes around the world use CERN's facilities
- 11 000 visiting scientists from over 113 countries
- Where the Web was born!



Europe



Data protection in the EU


- EU Directive 95/46/EC (1995)
 - **Transparency**: informing the user
 - **Legitimate** purpose and interest
 - **Commensurate** to the goal
- New regulation in progress (2015? 2017?)
 - “...all three components of the European law making process have now produced their proposed texts for a General Data Protection Regulation.”
 - Parliament
 - European Commission
 - Council of Ministers
 - There are significant differences!

Cybersecurity organization

- **Organization** (research lab, universities, etc.)
 - Fully manage their own security
- **National Research and Education Network (NREN) CSIRTs**
 - Leveraging security (focus: **network, IPs**)
 - Scope: national constituency
- **Infrastructure CSIRTs**
 - Leveraging security (focus: **identities, services**)
 - Scope: participating organizations within collaboration
- **Collaboration:**
 - Excellent among NRENs, excellent among infrastructures
 - NREN & Infrastructure CSIRTs complementary
- **Law Enforcement Agencies, industry**
 - Interaction with LEA extremely rare & difficult (legal)
 - Interaction with industry rare (privacy + funding)

Increased collaboration in Science

- Impact on security operations
 - Shared users
 - Shared resources (arbitrary remote code execution)
- Collaboration: incident propagation vector



Computer security incidents

- WLCG/EGI managed ~100 incidents in the last 10 years
 - Part of normal operations, business as usual
 - Most incidents are affecting multiple administrative domains

- **Windigo - Global scale - this happens now!**

http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/operation_windigo.pdf

- Involves sophisticated Windows, Linux very stealth malware
- Apache, Nginx and Lighttpd, OpenSSH, etc.
- Operates across complex fast-flux malicious infrastructure
- Over 25,000 compromised **servers**
- 35 million spam messages per day
- Many in the academic / research sector! (YOU!)

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Global computing

- Interpol (2012):

Cybercrime is bigger than cocaine, heroin and marijuana trafficking put together

80% online crime connected to international organised gangs

- This has a significant impact for our community

Paradigm shift

“Good old days”	2015
Local hardening and prompt patching	Local hardening and prompt patching
Local users	User communities and federations
Firewall & ports	Traceability
Malicious users	Malicious for-profit organizations
Linux/Unix based attacks	Linux, Windows, Web, mail combos
“hacked” via services (SSH, etc.)	“hacked” via admins and power users
Local expertise	Global intelligence & collaboration
Malicious software	Malicious infrastructures
Local management	Press and media
No escalation possible	Law enforcement may help

Email as a key intrusion vector

- 90%+ of breaches caused by spear phishing
 - Extremely effective ("shooting phish in a barrel"):
 - 10 emails = 1 click guaranteed
 - Targeted phishing: ~70% success rate
 - **HEPiX 2015: 9% click rate (good + technical audience!)**
- Antivirus highly ineffective
 - Attacker prepare an undetected variant of the malware e.g. Dyre/Upatre
 - Attacker send a short, high intensity burst of spam, 2-8h
 - Malware is NOT detected
 - AV informed, update signature within 12-24h
 - Attacker repeat steps daily

Targeted phishing

RD89 Collaboration Meeting June 29/30 2015, Jones Institute, 1st announcement — CERN SEC

This message contains remote content. [Load Remote Content](#)

Emilie D Bogart <Emilie.Bogart@jiscs.com> Today 16:10
To: cert@cern.ch
RD89 Collaboration Meeting June 29/30 2015, Jones Institute, 1st announcement

Dear Collaborator:

On the last meeting in Amsterdam we decided to have the next RD89 Collaboration meeting at Jones Institute. The date is now fixed (as we proposed in Amsterdam)

time:
Monday, June, 29. and Tuesday, June, 30. in 2015

location:
CERN, 1211 Geneva 23, Switzerland

For the Collaboration meeting you find the following information:

accomodation:
Do a reservation at the CERN hostel and send mail to Emilie.Bogart@jiscs.com
or look into our web-page to find a list of other hostels in Geneva or France.

further information:
<http://RD89.JISCS.COM/RD89/RDCERN67731TC.PDF>

Please inform us, wheather you attend the meeting, and if you like to report a topic or want to have it discussed.

In case you are missing a colleague on this mailing list, please forward it and let us know about the missing address, to be included in the list in future.

Emilie D Bogart
Emilie.Bogart@jiscs.com

Jones Institute

Targeted phishing

Result	Protocol	Host	URL	Body	Caching	Content
200	HTTP	rd85.jiscs.com	/RD85/TW9yZS0gPXg9Zmxhc2gsbnVsbAk=.jpg	0	no-stor...	image/jp
404	HTTP	rd85.jiscs.com	/favicon.ico	700		text/htr
302	HTTP	rd85.jiscs.com	/RD85/i/RDCERN61510QO.PDF	144	no-stor...	text/htr
302	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/	154	private	text/htr
200	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/Article.aspx?a=0	93,123	private	text/htr
304	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/site.css	0		
200	HTTP	rd78.jiscs.com	/RD78/RDCERN45252GL.PDF	192		text/htr
200	HTTP	rd78.jiscs.com	/RD78/200.js	14,272	no-stor...	text/htr
200	HTTP	rd78.jiscs.com	/RD78/TW9yZS0gPXg9Zmxhc2gsbnVsbAk=.jpg	0	no-stor...	image/jp
404	HTTP	rd78.jiscs.com	/favicon.ico	700		text/htr
302	HTTP	rd78.jiscs.com	/RD78/i/RDCERN45252GL.PDF	144	no-stor...	text/htr
302	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/	154	private	text/htr
200	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/Article.aspx?a=0	93,123	private	text/htr
200	HTTP	www.jiscs.com	/site.css	3,940		text/css

- Attacker fully controls "jiscs.com" DNS
- PDF is not a PDF (surprise!)
- Redirects to 200.js
- Cascading payloads

Raising the bar




CERN's upcoming Security Operations Center

- **Centralized system** for the detection, containment and remediation of IT threats
- **Ensures that security incidents are properly**
 - Identified
 - Analysed
 - Reported
 - Actioned / defended

System Design

- Unified platform for:
 - Data ingest
 - Storage
 - Analytics
- Multiple data access / view patterns:
 - Web based dynamic dashboards for querying and reporting
 - Command line interface
- Extensible, pluggable, modular architecture
- Data access control policies

System Architecture



Technology Goals

- Scale out, not up
- Integrated with the rest of the CERN IT ecosystem
- Make use of commodity hardware
- Make use of cheap, massively-scalable storage (standard SAS attached disk enclosures)
- Deployment inside OpenStack
- Configuration management done via Puppet


Technologies Used at CERN

- Telemetry Capture Layer: Apache Flume
- Data Bus (Transport): Apache Kafka
- Stream Processor: Apache Spark
- Long-Term Data Store: HDFS
- Real-Time Index and Search: Apache Solr
- Visualization Platform: Hue


Alternatives

- CERN's Security Operations Center shares similarities with CISCO's OpenSOC platform
- Most companies and organizations are using similar technology stacks or other big data platforms:
 - Elasticsearch / Logstash / Kibana
 - Splunk
- Trusted online group already set up for discussing SOC infrastructure (get in touch with us if you would like to join)

IOC lifecycle



CIF: Collective Intelligence Framework



From <http://csirtgadgets.org/collective-intelligence-framework/>

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MISP: Malware Information Sharing Platform



From <https://www.circl.lu/services/misp-malware-information-sharing-platform/>

Future of academic security

- Security as a **global issue**
 - Operations, traceability, incident handling, policies
 - Increased costs foreseen (traceability, expertise)
- Global adversaries
 - Impossible to defend without dedicated experts
 - Distributed security models unlikely to work
 - Most participating organizations will most likely deal with “traceability” requests
 - Security vendors will likely participate in incidents/forensics
 - Global response
 - **International collaboration**
 - **Threat intelligence will be a key aspect**
- Target switching
 - Services will no longer be the main targets
 - **Users and service managers will be**

Conclusions

- Paradigm shift:
 - Global issue
 - Establish a solid network of security contacts
 - Liaise with security vendors and law enforcement
 - Ultimately, people are the target

- Adversaries are now too sophisticated to deal with alone
 - Participate/invest in global trust frameworks
 - Contribute to global internet security issues
 - Commercial and government adversaries will continue to rise
 - Critical to liaise with other experts, in and outside the community

- Design our infrastructure(s) to deal with global incident response
 - Have appropriate legal, policy and technical tools
 - Remove concept of community/organization/academic/public-private boundaries



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